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WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT: BARD V. W.L. GORE’S
THOUGHTFUL SHIFT FROM JURY TO JUDGE
Alex Czanik∗

I. INTRODUCTION
As Apple v. Samsung was grabbing national attention in 2013 over
their costly smartphone patent dispute, in January 2013 the Supreme
Court of the United States refused to hear W.L. Gore’s appeal resulting
in nearly $900 million in damages since W.L. Gore’s conduct was
deemed willful.1 While typical patent litigations are high stakes affairs
often involving million dollar damage calculations and potential market
exclusion for the loser, a willful infringement determination raises the
stakes even further.
Accusations of willful patent infringement are included in virtually
every patent infringement lawsuit as boilerplate language.2 A detailed
study conducted by Kimberly Moore,3 found that over the two-year
period from 1999 through 2000, over 92% of all patent infringement
complaints included an allegation of willful infringement.4 This high
percentage can be partially explained by the possibility of treble
damages and payment of attorneys’ fees.5 This increased liability is
enough to test the wherewithal of any seasoned corporate executive.
This Casenote addresses why Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L.
Gore & Associates, Inc. (Bard), a 2012 Federal Circuit decision that
altered the willful patent infringement landscape, was correctly decided.
Part II begins with an overview of patents, patent infringement, and the
various types of patent damages available, and then considers the
progression of pertinent willful infringement cases that have shaped this
standard. Part III considers the principal case, Bard, including
∗ Associate Member, 2012–2013 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank his family for their encouragement and support.
1. Greg Stohr & Susan Decker, Bard Wins Round as High Court Rejects Gore Patent Appeal,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-01-14/bard-wins-round-ashigh-court-rejects-gore-patent-appeal.html. See W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 932 (2013).
2. John T. Gallagher, The Evolution of the Standard for Establishing Willful Infringement—
After Five Years the Objective Recklessness Component of Seagate Is Now a Question of Law,
BLOOMBERG
BNA,
Aug.
17,
2012,
at
3,
available
at
http://www.sillscummis.com/Repository/Files/2012_August_Gallagher.pdf.
3. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Kimberly A. Moore, Circuit Judge,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kimberly-a-moore-circuit-judge.html (Kimberly A. Moore was
appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by President Bush in 2006).
4. Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J.
227, 231–32 (2004).
5. Gallagher, supra note 2.
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sentiments from both the panel majority as well as the dissent. Part IV
answers why this case was correctly decided as well as the case’s
practical implications on litigants, the court system, and other interested
parties. Part V concludes by summarizing the key effects on the
stakeholders.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Background on Patent Enforcement
A patent gives its owner the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling a patented invention for a limited period of time.6 The
Framers, seeing the inherent benefits of the patent system,
constitutionally delegated to Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”7 The goal of the patent system is to bring innovative
technologies and new designs into the public realm through disclosure.8
This ultimately promotes innovation in society by addressing the
inherent costs and risks associated with research and development,
making sure the patent incentive structure appropriately awards
innovation without adversely impacting consumers and the community
at large.9
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), one is liable for patent infringement when
one “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent.”10 Unlike many other
areas of the law, patent infringement “is a strict liability offense,”11
resulting in liability even if the infringer inadvertently, unintentionally,
or even unknowingly infringes a patent.12 As a result, companies must
be vigilant in making sure their products do not unknowingly infringe
upon another’s valid patent. Therefore, forward thinking companies
6. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012). The limited period of time is currently approximately twenty
years from the date of filing the United States patent application. Id.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989) (“[The] patent
system is a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and
nonobvious advances in technology.”).
9. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES
WITH
COMPETITION,
at
1
(Mar.
2011),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
11. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
12. Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968).
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obtain a non-infringement opinion, also known as a clearance opinion,
prior to releasing a product into the market.
To compensate patent owners from those infringers attempting to
profit from the owners’ invention, courts can provide a wide variety of
damages including injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and
enhanced damages.13 Injunctions preserve the patentee’s exclusivity
moving forward and deter the infringement of other parties, while
compensatory damages make the patent owner whole as a result of the
infringement.14
Enhanced damages deter willful infringement,
purposefully punishing the infringer by awarding the patentee greater
damages than the amount of harm suffered.15
Enhanced damages are statutorily based in 35 U.S.C. § 284, allowing
the court to increase damages up to three times the amount initially
found or assessed.16 However, the statute is silent upon when an award
of enhanced damages is appropriate.17 Case law fills this void with
willfulness being one such way the court may enhance damages.
Awarding enhanced damages requires “a two-step process: first, the fact
finder must determine if an accused infringer is guilty of conduct, such
as willfulness, upon which enhanced damages may be based, and, if so,
the court must then exercise its discretion to determine if damages
should be enhanced given the totality of the circumstances.”18
The Federal Circuit utilizes nine nonexclusive Read factors to
determine the extent of enhanced damages awarded.19
When
13. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, at 141.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). The statute states in relevant part:
[u]pon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made
of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court. . . . When
the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either event the court may
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed. Increased damages under
this paragraph shall not apply to provisional rights under section 154(d). . . . The court may
receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination of damages or of what royalty would be
reasonable under the circumstances.
Id.
17. Id.
18. Saint-Gobain Autover USA, Inc. v. Xinyi Glass N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 737, 745
(N.D. Ohio 2010).
19. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The factors the Federal
Circuit considered, now commonly referred to as the Read factors, are
(1) [w]hether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another, (2) [w]hether the
infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and
formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not otherwise infringed, . . . (3)
[the i]nfringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation, . . . (4) [the d]efendant’s size and financial
condition, . . . (5) [the c]loseness of the case, . . . (6) [the d]uration of the defendant’s
misconduct, . . . (7) [the r]emedial action by the defendant, . . . (8) [the d]efendant’s motivation

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014

3

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 7

286

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

considering these factors, the appropriate question is whether the
factors, taken as a whole, suggest the infringement was willful.20 Even
though the Federal Circuit has made clear that “[t]he test for willfulness
is distinct and separate from the factors guiding a district court’s
discretion regarding enhanced damages,”21 some of the factors are
frequently used in determining whether willful infringement occurred in
the first place. The court can only award enhanced damages “as a
penalty for an infringer’s increased culpability, namely willful
infringement or bad faith.”22 Paramount to this determination is the
egregiousness of the infringer’s conduct, considered by examining the
infringer’s culpability.23
Willfulness serves as a financial deterrent to infringement.24 The trial
court is required to explain the basis of the enhancement, especially in
instances where the maximum amount is imposed.25 If enhanced
damages are not enough to ward off would be infringers, 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 enables the court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the
prevailing party in “exceptional” cases.26
B. Development of Willful Infringement
Since § 284 fails to define willfulness, what exactly constitutes
willfulness has been subject to judicial interpretation and has undergone
many changes over the years. In 1983, the newly established Federal
Circuit27 crafted a national standard for willful patent infringement in
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. where the
patent owner offered to license the patents at issue for $200,000.28
Instead of paying the license fee, the infringer obtained from its in house

for harm, and . . . (9) [w]hether [the] defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.
Id.
20. Imonex Servs. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
21. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2009), withdrawn and
superseded on reh’g, 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
22. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
23. Read, 970 F.2d at 826.
24. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
25. Read, 970 F.2d at 828.
26. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). The statute states, “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” Id.
27. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Title I, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). The Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit having nationwide
appellate jurisdiction over patent litigation.
28. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
1983), overruled by In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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counsel a short opinion, stating that the competitor’s patents were
invalid due to a prior printed publication.29
The court held that where a potential infringer possesses actual notice
of another’s patent rights, the potential infringer has an affirmative duty
to utilize due care in determining infringement.30 This affirmative duty
includes, but is not limited to, obtaining competent legal advice from
counsel before potentially infringing activity occurs.31 The court
determined that the short opinion drafted by the infringer’s in house
counsel contained “bald, conclusory and unsupported remarks regarding
validity and infringement,” and therefore, could not be justifiably relied
upon.32 As a result, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
tripling of the $200,000 in damages, extinguishing the infringer’s smoke
screen defense.
In subsequent decisions, the Federal Circuit held that willfulness does
not require intentional infringement. Willful patent infringement can
come in all shapes and sizes. The court stated in Rite-Hite Corp v.
Kelley Co. that “[w]illfulness’ in infringement, as in life, is not an all-ornothing trait, but one of degree. It recognizes that infringement may
range from unknowing or accidental, to deliberate or reckless, disregard
of a patentee’s legal rights.”33
C. The Seagate Standard
In re Seagate Tech, a 2007 Federal Circuit en banc decision, altered
the willfulness standard that guided the patent world for over two
decades by abandoning Underwater Devices’s affirmative duty to
exercise due care that established “a lower threshold for willful
infringement that [was] more akin to negligence.”34 Underwater
Devices’s low standard failed to align with willfulness in the civil
context and was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.35 The
Seagate court considered an alleged infringer’s production of three
opinion letters prepared by outside counsel, which analyzed the
company’s litigation exposure for each of the patents at issue.
Seagate established a two-prong test that still serves as the backbone
for willful patent infringement.36 To satisfy the first prong, the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1385.
Id. at 1389.
Id. at 1390.
Id.
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125–26 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 69 (2007)).
In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
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“patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
infringement of a valid patent.”37 The alleged infringer’s state of mind
is irrelevant to the objective inquiry.38
The Federal Circuit, likely understanding the inherent ambiguity in
the first prong of the Seagate test, acknowledged that objective
recklessness is not self-defining, leaving it “to future cases to further
develop the application of this standard.”39 Justice Pauline Newman, in
a concurring opinion, forecasted that “new uncertainties are introduced
by the court’s evocation of ‘objective standards’ for such inherently
subjective criteria as ‘recklessness’ and ‘reasonableness,’” and hoped
that “judicial wisdom” would prevail.40
Only after the patentee shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the alleged infringer acted “objectively reckless” is the second prong
even considered.41 To satisfy the second prong, “the patentee must also
demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk . . . was either known or so
obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.”42
Since the patentee must establish willful infringement, rather than the
infringer, the court abandoned the prior obligation to obtain a noninfringement opinion.43 While not dispositive, a pre-litigation opinion
of counsel obtained by the infringer may still preclude the infringer’s
conduct from being deemed reckless.44
In coming to this decision, the court considered willful infringement
of copyrights, which requires that the defendant recklessly disregard that
his conduct could constitute infringement.45 Changed circumstances
justified overruling this longstanding precedent because Underwater
Devices was decided when “widespread disregard of patent rights was
undermining the national innovation incentive.”46
Recognizing that issues of willfulness are often complex and may not
always involve questions of fact, the Federal Circuit revisited the
objective recklessness prong of Seagate in Powell v. Home Depot to

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 1371 (Gajarsa, J., majority).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1374.
45. Id. at 1370 (citing Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001)).
46. Id. at 1369 (“Reinforcement of this duty was a foundation of the formation of the Federal
Circuit court, at a time when widespread disregard of patent rights was undermining the national
innovation incentive.” Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc)).
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address when a court, as opposed to a jury, may properly consider the
first prong of the Seagate standard.47 In Powell, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s judgment that the defendant infringed a
patent for radial saw arm guards and awarded nearly $24 million in total
damages.48 Since neither of the issues presented by the alleged infringer
as defenses were before the jury, the court properly considered the
objective prong.49 Conversely, if a purely factual matter was at the heart
of the dispute, possibly as to whether an anticipation defense to willful
infringement was reasonable, the objective prong would have properly
been considered by the jury.50 This is because whether a claim is
anticipated is a question of fact.51
The more difficult question left unresolved by Powell occurs when
the defense to a willfulness claim depends on both issues of fact and
law. The court found that if separate issues of fact and law are
presented by the infringer as defenses to willful infringement, both the
court and the jury might be required for the analysis.52 While Powell
noted that both the judge and jury may be required for a determination
of objective recklessness, the court did not define precise roles which
later proved problematic for district courts. For example, if both
anticipation and obviousness were raised as defenses of noninfringement, the judge would evaluate whether it was objectively
reckless to rely upon the obviousness defense, while the jury would
evaluate the reasonableness of the anticipation defense.53 Unlike
anticipation, obviousness is ultimately a legal conclusion based upon
factual inquiries.54
The Powell court held that patentees are required to prove the
objective prong by clear and convincing evidence before the jury can
consider the question of willfulness.55 However, this objective prong is
not satisfied when an alleged infringer relies on a reasonable defense of
non-infringement.56 Similarly, the first prong is not sufficiently satisfied
47. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (quoting Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1236–37 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
48. Powell, 663 F.3d at 1242.
49. Id. at 1237.
50. Id. at 1236–37.
51. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1984). “The district court’s determination of no anticipation was a factual one.” Id.
52. Powell, 663 F.3d at 1237.
53. Gallagher, supra note 2, at 7.
54. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
55. Powell, 663 F.3d at 1236; see DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567
F.3d 1314, 1335–37 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (declining to address the subjective prong when the objective
prong had not been established).
56. Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
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when a reasonable conclusion could be reached that there was no
infringement.57 As a result, the question on appeal is often whether an
alleged infringer’s defense was reasonable.58
III. PRINCIPAL CASE: BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR, INC. V. W.L. GORE &
ASSOCIATES, INC.
A. Background
The invention at issue concerned prosthetic vascular tubes used to
replace or reinforce blood vessels allowing for improved blood flow
throughout the body.59 W.L. Gore & Associates provided the tubes to
Bard Peripheral Vascular for use in Bard’s research, but Gore had no
right to control Bard’s research.60 After conducting multiple tests
successfully, Bard completed the required inventive steps. After both
Gore and Bard filed patent applications covering the tube, Bard was
awarded priority since Bard had completed the required inventive steps
before Gore.61 In 2002, U.S. Patent 6,436,135 (’135 patent) was granted
and assigned to Bard.62 Since Gore was using the invention after Bard
was assigned the ’135 patent, Bard filed suit for patent infringement.
In 2010, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona
found that the ’135 patent was willfully infringed by Gore and not
invalid for improper inventorship, lack of written description,
anticipation, or obviousness.63 As a result, the district court, in
accordance with the jury’s findings, awarded enhanced damages,
attorneys’ fees, costs, and an ongoing royalty to Bard.64 The jury
awarded Bard damages exceeding $185 million plus an ongoing
royalty.65 The district court then doubled the damages increasing Bard’s
award to approximately $371 million and awarded $19 million in
attorneys’ fees and other non-taxable costs.66 With interest, fees, and
57. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
58. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
59. U.S. Patent No. 6,436,135 (filed Oct. 24, 1974).
60. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1176–77 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), opinion vacated in part on reconsideration, 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 932 (2013) and vacated in part on reh’g en banc, 476 F. App’x 747 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 932 (2013).
61. Id. at 1177.
62. Id. at 1176, 1194. The ’135 patent was filed in 1974 after pending for 28 years before the
Patent and Trademark Office including two appeals to the Federal Circuit. Id.
63. Id. at 1177–78.
64. Id. at 1175.
65. Id. at 1178.
66. Id.
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ongoing royalties, the potential award has risen to over $900 million.67
In February 2012, a Federal Circuit panel, with Judge Gajarsa writing
for the majority, affirmed all judgments of the district court, including
willful infringement and enhancement of damages, finding substantial
evidence to satisfy both Seagate prongs.68 However, allowing the jury
to evaluate the reasonableness of the joint inventorship and obviousness
defenses was in direct conflict with Powell, which only three months
earlier declared the judge had sole discretion over questions of law.69
Gore petitioned for a panel rehearing and an en banc rehearing,
challenging the willfulness determination. The Federal Circuit en banc,
while denying full review, largely affirmed the jury’s verdict and found
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding enhanced
damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and an ongoing royalty, but granted a
rehearing “for the limited purpose of authorizing the panel to revise the
portion of its opinion addressing willfulness.”70
B. Majority
Judge Gajarsa, again writing for the majority, determined that the trial
court failed to consider the objective prong of the willfulness analysis as
a separate requirement to the subjective prong, and as a result, vacated
the trial court’s willfulness analysis.71
Even in cases after Seagate that continually recited the proposition
that willfulness ultimately presents a question of fact, the Federal Circuit
has begun to realize that the issues in dispute are often far more
complex, and often include interwoven questions of law.72 In
determining the appropriate standard to be applied to the first Seagate
prong, the decision to label the issue a question of law, question of fact,
or mixed question of law and fact “is sometimes as much a matter of
allocation as it is of analysis.”73 However, the Federal Circuit had yet to
be called upon to delineate the objective recklessness prong until this
case.74
67. Stohr & Decker, supra note 1.
68. Bard, 670 F.3d.
69. Gallagher, supra note 2, at 7. Subsequent to Gore’s appeal brief being submitted, but before
a decision was issued, the Federal Circuit handed down Powell involving two issues of law, a
preliminary injunction and inequitable conduct.
70. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., 476 F. App’x 747, 748 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 932 (2013).
71. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
72. Id. at 1006.
73. Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1985)).
74. Id.
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Considering the objective prong of Seagate, the judge may allow the
jury to determine the underlying facts when the question is one of fact or
a mix of law and of fact, such as anticipation or obviousness.75
“[W]hether a reasonable person would have considered there to be a
high likelihood of infringement of a valid patent should always be
decided as a matter of law by the judge.”76
While the ultimate question of willfulness based on an assessment of the
second prong of Seagate may be a question of fact, Seagate also requires
a threshold determination of objective recklessness. That determination
entails an objective assessment of potential defenses based on the risk
presented by the patent. Those defenses may include questions of
infringement but also can be expected in almost every case to entail
questions of validity that are not necessarily dependent on the factual
77
circumstances of the particular party accused of infringement.

The majority determined that the court is in the best position to make the
reasonableness determination.78 Additionally, the threshold objective
prong of willful infringement stated in Seagate, “even though predicated
on underlying mixed questions of law and fact, is best decided by the
judge as a question of law subject to de novo review.”79
Looking back to Powell, when a non-infringement defense is based
upon a purely legal theory, such as claim construction, the objective
recklessness analysis is conducted by a judge.80 When the objective
recklessness depends upon factual issues, such as anticipation or
obviousness, the judge remains the final arbiter in deciding whether a
defense was reasonable, even if the jury answers factual questions.81
Furthermore, even if factual issues are present, the ultimate question of
objective recklessness is “to be determined by the court, either on a
pretrial motion for partial summary judgment or on a motion for
judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence and after the
jury verdict.”82
As a result, the Federal Circuit panel remanded the issue of
willfulness so the trial court could reconsider its denial of judgment as a
matter of law in light of the holding.83

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
(1997)).
83.

Id. at 1008.
Id.
Id. at 1006.
Id.
Id. at 1007.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40–41
Id. at 1005.
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C. Dissent
Judge Newman dissented in part, finding that the general guide for
willful infringement allowing for multiplication of damages is whether
the alleged infringer acted both unreasonably and with knowledge that
their actions were infringing a patent.84 Finding that the Federal Circuit
“now acts to correct its ruling on the subject of willful infringement,”
Judge Newman felt that remand was unwarranted due to the laundry list
of potentially relevant facts that Gore could have relied on to form a
reasonable belief that the ’135 patent would be invalidated.85 This
would have allowed Gore to continue to produce the Gore-Tex grafts as
the company had done for the 28 years when the patent was pending.86
Judge Newman did not find that Gore was sufficiently culpable to
discretionarily enhance the damages.87 Moreover, since Gore’s defenses
were relevant to the willfulness analysis, Judge Newman felt that the
Federal Circuit should consider the issues of invalidity and inventorship,
and order retrial of the entire case only if appropriate in the interest of
justice.88
IV. DISCUSSION
Only five years after the Federal Circuit’s en banc Seagate decision,
the Federal Circuit significantly altered the legal landscape concerning
willful patent infringement, holding that the objective recklessness
prong is a question of law decided by the trial judge.89 However, unlike
Seagate, the Federal Circuit provided guidance to aid future litigants.
Bard v. W.L. Gore was correctly decided because the thoughtful shift
from jury to judge (1) reinforces the trend of related precedent, (2)
aligns willfulness within the enhanced damages framework, (3) enables
judges, who are better suited, to determine objective recklessness as a
matter of law, (4) aids in trial management by reducing expensive
litigation resources, and (5) unifies precedent by utilizing de novo
review.

84. Id. at 1009 (Newman, J., dissenting).
85. Id. These facts include (1) the USPTO previously ruled and the Federal Circuit affirmed that
Gore’s employee Cooper was the first to conceive the patented invention; (2) Cooper provided the tube
which Goldfarb later patented; (3) Goldfarb tested the tubes on dogs at Cooper’s request; and (4) others
previously tested the Gore-Tex tubes in dogs and sheep reporting and publishing results that Goldfarb
later patented. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Gallagher, supra note 2, at 2.
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A. Reinforces the Trend of Precedent
Bard is precedentially aligned within the context of willfulness,
patent law, and prior Supreme Court decisions both in substance and
form. Bard’s well-reasoned opinion draws strength from precedent both
within and outside of the patent law context.
Bard is consistent with the prior trend of case law addressing
willfulness. While the Federal Circuit stated in 1991 that willfulness
was a question of fact,90 this position has been deeply eroded by more
recent cases. Seagate abandoned the affirmative duty of care standard
established by Underwater Devices, replacing it with a test comprised of
both objective and subjective components.91 Courts have recognized the
inherent difficulties with juries determining willfulness in the patent
infringement context. In Powell, since both of the issues presented were
questions of law, the court properly considered the objective prong.92
This expansion of the role of the court in considering objective
recklessness further bolstered Bard’s shift.
Bard is consistent within patent law regarding objectively baseless
claims, allowing courts to enhance damages and payment of attorneys’
fees under § 285.93 The Federal Circuit had previously ruled that the
standard for objective baselessness allowing for § 285 damages is
“identical to the objective recklessness standard for enhanced damages
and attorneys’ fees against an accused infringer for § 284 willful
infringement actions under Seagate.”94 If a reasonable litigant would
realistically expect a favorable outcome, then the suit is immune from
§ 285 damages. Likewise, the objective recklessness prong of Seagate
is not met where a reasonable litigant would not have expected that their
actions constituted an “objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted infringement of a valid patent.”95
Bard is consistent within the patent law context because it advances
the role of the judge, aligning it with the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision
in Markman v. Westview Instruments. Justice Souter, writing for a
unanimous Court, stated that the construction and interpretation of
patent claims is to be determined as a matter of law by the judge.96
Similar to the reasoning in Bard, the Court in Markman found that a
judge utilizing extensive legal training is better suited to construe patent
90.
91.
92.
93.

Slimfold Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007 (Fed. Cir.

2012).
94. Id. (quoting iLOR, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
95. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
96. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
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claims than a jury.97 The Supreme Court determined that “any
credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily
sophisticated analysis of the whole document, required by the standard
rule of construction that a term can be defined only in a way that
comports with the instrument as a whole.”98 Claim interpretation, based
upon the language of the patent, is properly considered by the court.
Bard is also consistent with Supreme Court precedent concerning
sham antitrust litigation, which like the willfulness standard enunciated
by the Federal Circuit in Bard, includes a subjective prong that is
considered only after the objective prong is fully satisfied.99 Thus, in
the two-prong sham test, the first prong considers whether the lawsuit is
“objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits.”100 Similar to Bard, the
Supreme Court decided that the objective reasonableness of the suit
should be decided by the judge as a matter of law.101 The subjective
prong concerning whether the lawsuit is an attempt to directly interfere
with a competitor’s business relationships is not even considered if a
judge determines the lawsuit was not objectively baseless as a matter of
law.102
As a result, Bard is consistent in substance by requiring both
objective and subjective components, and in form by requiring that the
subjective component only be considered after the objective component
is fully satisfied. Bard’s alignment is further seen considering
willfulness and enhanced damages.
B. Aligns Willfulness Within the Enhanced Damages Framework
Bard provides the necessary linkage between the language of § 284
and precedent on willfulness, while still maintaining a degree of
separation by allowing the subjective component to only be considered
after the objective component is fully satisfied.
The plain language of § 284, canons of statutory construction, and
precedent demand that only the judge award enhanced damages. Bard
helps to align the statutory language of the enhanced damages statute,
§ 284, with the Federal Circuit’s predicate requirement of willfulness.103
97. Id. at 388–89.
98. Id. at 389.
99. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993).
100. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (citing Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60).
101. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 63.
102. Id. at 60.
103. See David Crouch, Enhanced Damages: The Seagate Objectively Reckless Standard Is Now
a Question of Law to be Decided by a Judge and Reviewed De Novo on Appeal, PATENTLY-O (Jun. 18,
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The plain language of § 284 recognizes that the court, not the jury,
shall determine the enhancement of damages stating, “[w]hen the
damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either
event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed.”104
Canons of statutory construction provide further support. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, meaning “the express mention of one thing
excludes all others,” as applied to § 284 conveys that only the court may
increase damages. Since § 284 differentiates between jury and court,
each term is exclusive of the other. The drafter’s intentional distinction
demonstrates that the drafters expressly delegated to the court, not the
jury, the ability to enhance damages.105 Courts should not presume that
this difference is due to a simple drafting mistake.106
Additionally, when statutes are read in pari materia, the same words
must be given the same meaning in related statutes “as if they were one
law.”107 The Supreme Court found “[t]he rule of in pari materia―like
any canon of statutory construction―is a reflection of practical
experience in the interpretation of statutes: a legislative body generally
uses a particular word with a consistent meaning in a given context.”108
When the statute’s components are read together, the distinction
between jury and court must be given meaning. Likewise, “[w]here
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or

2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/06/enhanced-damages-the-seagate-objectively-recklessis-now-a-question-of-law-to-be-decided-by-a-judge-and-reviewed-de-novo-on.html.
104. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (emphasis added).
105. Nat’l R. R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R. R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
A frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation expressly provides
a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume
other remedies. ‘When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the
negative of any other mode.’ This principle of statutory construction reflects an ancient
maxim—expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
106. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
107. United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 564 (1845).
The correct rule of interpretation is, that if divers statutes relate to the same thing, they ought all
to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them, and it is an established rule of law,
that all acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were one law. If a thing contained
in a subsequent statute be within the reason of a former statute, it shall be taken to be within the
meaning of that statute; and if it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia, what
meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former statute, they will amount to a
legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
108. Erlenbaugh v. U. S., 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/7

14

Czanik: Willful Patent Infringement: Bard v. W.L. Gore's Thoughtful Shift

2013] BARD V. W.L. GORE’S THOUGHTFUL SHIFT FROM JURY TO JUDGE

297

exclusion.”109
The Fifth Circuit, prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, correctly
determined that substituting “judge or jury” for the word “court,” results
in the paragraph reading “nonsensically: ‘[w]hen the damages are not
found by a jury, the [jury or judge] . . . shall assess them.’”110 The Fifth
Circuit recognized that manipulating the statute results in unreasonable
and unintentional results. Similarly, the Federal Circuit has stated “the
extent of the enhancement . . . is committed to the discretion of the trial
court.”111
The problem pre-Bard is that, according to § 284, enhanced damages
are determined by the court,112 while prior Federal Circuit jurisprudence
stated that willfulness was a question of fact decided by the jury.113
These two determinations fail to coincide. Allowing the threshold
determination of willfulness to be determined by a judge, while allowing
the jury to complete the subjective prong provides the necessary linkage
in language.
Bard also provides the necessary separation between the objective
recklessness prong, determined by a judge, from the subjective
knowledge prong, decided by the jury. Before Bard, if the issue was a
question of fact, the jury would still decide both the subjective and
objective components. This failed to comport with § 284 requiring the
court to assess enhanced damages.
C. Enables Better Positioned Judges to Make the Determination
Bard was correctly decided because the court is best positioned to
make a threshold determination of objective recklessness as opposed to
a jury, enabling an improved allocation of decision-making authority:
When an ‘issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a
simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a
determination that, as a matter of sound administration of justice, one
judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
114
question.’

While juries are generally better positioned to make objective

109. Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722
(5th Cir. 1972)).
110. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 412 (5th Cir. 1964).
111. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
112. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
113. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
114. Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
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determinations,115 the technical nature of patents makes patent law
distinct. As a unanimous Supreme Court in Markman stated, “judges,
not juries, are the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent
terms.”116 Patent claims have become highly technical and complicated
partially due to the special doctrines dealing with patent form and scope
developed by courts and the Patent Office.117 In addition to the
increasing complexity of technology, perverse incentives exist for patent
attorneys to craft claims that allow for the greatest coverage for their
clients while still narrow enough to be valid. This in turn muddied the
waters resulting in greater complexity for all parties involved.
Judicial predictability is crucial for uniform precedent and sound
business decision-making. Judges, as opposed to juries, are more likely
to make predictable determinations of willful patent infringement.118
Judges, due to their legal training, are better suited to separate subjective
inquiry facts from objective inquiry facts, such as knowledge of the
patent or copying on the part of the infringer.119 A jury lacks the
experience acquired from years of sitting on the bench in determining
which actions constitute objective recklessness.120 A juror would find it
difficult to evaluate “objective recklessness” and the reasonableness of
many invalidity and non-infringement defenses presented.121 This
precise rationale persuaded the Supreme Court in Markman.122
Critics of Bard state that this new willfulness standard could morph
into a “double-edged sword,” since once the trial judge determines that
the infringer acted objectively reckless, the jury will then be hard
pressed to not return a verdict of willfulness.123 As a result, when the
jury considers the subjective Seagate prong, their inquiry could largely
be shaped by the judge’s upfront determination.124 This game of follow
115. An example would be the reasonableness of a defense. Bard, 682 F.3d at 1007.
116. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996).
117. Id. at 389.
118. Sanford E. Warren Jr. & Andrew F. Quecan, Willful Patent Infringement after Bard: Less
Likely Now, IRMI (July 2012), http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2012/warren07-intellectualproperty-law.aspx.
119. Marc C. Segal, Tell it to the Judge, Federal Circuit Rules The Judge—Not Jury—Decides
Threshold Issue of Willful Infringement in Patent Cases, BALLARD SPAHR, LLP (July 9, 2012, 11:46
AM),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/patentlaw/blogs/patentgrantsandlawsuits/archive/2012/07/09/ball
ard-spahr-llp-tell-it-to-the-judge-federal-circuit-rules-the-judge-not-jury-decides-threshold-issue-ofwillful-infringement-in-patent-cases.aspx.
120. Gallagher, supra note 2, at 5.
121. Id.
122. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388–90.
123. Gallagher, supra note 2, at 2.
124. PLC Intell. Prop. & Tech., Objective Recklessness for Willful Patent Infringement Is a
Matter of Law: Federal Circuit, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY (June 18, 2012),
http://us.practicallaw.com/1-519-9071?source=relatedcontent#null.
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the leader could result in the jury potentially rubber stamping the
judge’s objective determination of the first Seagate willfulness prong,
without even giving much thought to the second subjective prong of the
analysis.
Even if a jury fails to perform a complete analysis of Seagate’s
second prong, allowing the judge to determine the first prong of
objective recklessness is still preferred. In the past, juries sometimes
incorporated facts that only should pertain to the subjective prong into
the objective prong analysis.125 The average juror would find it difficult
to properly allocate the evidence to the appropriate prong, even if the
juror understood the plain language of the subjective and objective
prongs. For example, if the jury was presented substantial evidence that
the accused infringer knowingly copied the product, the jury would have
a hard time considering the required objective obviousness prong
knowing such evidence. The jury’s analysis would likely encompass the
fact that the infringer knowingly copied, even though evidence of
knowledge should not be considered under the objective prong. This
poses a problem since under Seagate, both prongs must be met before a
finding of willfulness can be concluded. Allowing the court to decide
the objective recklessness prong as a matter of law eliminates this
problem and properly allocates the decision-making authority to those
best suited.
Many times, patent defenses are based upon subtleties and scientific
distinctions that might be difficult to grasp without significant
experience and advanced education. With a judge determining the
objective prong, evidence related to the reasonableness of the alleged
infringer’s defenses will not be summarily dismissed due to being overly
complex. For example, most courts bar reexamination126 evidence from
being considered by the jury due to the varied requirements on burden of
proof and relevancy.127 Therefore, if a litigant could not properly frame
the evidence, or if the court excluded the evidence out of fear of
misrepresentation, valuable aspects of the case would never be
considered at trial.
An important consideration is whether a judge or jury is more likely
to determine that willful infringement occurred, and whether evidence
supporting or rejecting objective recklessness is viewed differently when
125. Segal, supra note 119.
126. See generally U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2246 (2012). Reexamination is a procedure through which a granted patent is
reevaluated by the Patent and Trademark Office. A reexamination request can be submitted by anyone,
and the key question is whether the prior art raises a “substantial new question of patentability of at least
one claim.” Id.
127. Cislo & Thomas, LLP, Federal Circuit Changes Willful Patent Infringement Analysis,
http://cisloandthomas.com/319 (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).
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a judge, as opposed to a jury, is the decision maker.128 A 2012
empirical study analyzed the effect of Seagate by looking at willful
patent infringement cases for three years preceding and three years
following Seagate.129 The analysis found that pre-Seagate, a jury found
willfulness in 61% of the cases while a judge found willfulness in 54%
of the cases.130 Post-Seagate, a jury found willfulness in 62% of the
cases while a judge found willfulness in only 19% of the cases.131
While the jury’s likelihood of finding willfulness did not change
according to the study, the judge’s likelihood of finding willfulness
significantly diminished.132 Since judges find willfulness in fewer
circumstances, as the study suggests,133 this shift of the objective
recklessness prong of Seagate will likely have profound impact upon
litigants.
The empirical studies considering the effect of judge and jury lend
credence to the proposition that a jury might fail to consider both prongs
of Seagate in their analysis, possibly even going by their gut feeling on
whether infringement was willful. Since Seagate imposes a higher
burden on the patent owner, successful verdicts of willful infringement
should drop both when the judge is the decision maker and when the
jury is the decision maker. However, this was not the case. The more
rigid two-pronged Seagate test did not have a statistically significant
effect upon the jury’s determination of willfulness.134 This suggests
that, after the jury determines that the patent was merely infringed, the
rubber-stamping so feared by critics of Bard occurs post-Seagate despite
the more rigid Seagate formula.135
Some juries fail to understand the higher burden imposed to
determine willful infringement rather than just simple infringement.
This is partially due to the complex jury instructions. The Model Patent
Jury Instructions, created by the National Jury Instruction Project,
require the reading level of a college senior, so many jurors may fail to
understand the complicated requirements placed upon them in

128. Gallagher, supra note 2, at 5.
129. Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In Re
Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 417 (2012).
130. Id. at 445.
131. Id.
132. Id. Since the jury found willfulness in 60.9% of cases before Seagate and 61.9% after
Seagate, using a Pearson’s chi-squared test, this result was not found to be statistically significant. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 420.
135. Martin Bader & Bill Blonigan, Courts to Play Greater Role Moderating Enhanced Damages
for
Willful
Patent
Infringement,
JDSUPRA
LAW
NEWS
(Jul.
3
2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/courts-to-play-greater-role-moderating-e-24094.
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deliberation.136 Since the judge determines objective recklessness,
evidence related to the alleged infringer’s state of mind and subjective
intent will no longer taint this threshold objective determination.137
Jurors can then freely evaluate whether the infringer knew or should
have known that their actions constituted infringement. Allowing the
court to consider the objective prong and the jury to consider the
subjective prong provides for a better allocation of decision-making
authority.
Judges, recognizing that the jury fails to complete the entire Seagate
two-pronged test, do not automatically award enhanced damages once
the jury finds willfulness. A 1983–2000 study, conducted by Kimberly
Moore, found that when judges made a determination of willfulness,
enhanced damages were awarded 95% of the time, but when a jury
made a determination of willfulness, enhanced damages were only
awarded 63% of the time.138 After Seagate, juries found willfulness
62% of the time while judges only 19% of the time, this partially
diminishes the importance of the decision maker.139 However, this shift
of the objective recklessness prong of Seagate will still have profound
impact upon litigants.
D. Aids in Trial Management
Bard will aid in trial management, allowing for more efficient use of
judicial resources and simplification of judicial proceedings. This
change effectively makes the trial judge the gatekeeper for allegations of
willful infringement, by allowing the question to reach the jury only
after the alleged infringer demonstrated, by clear and convincing
evidence, objective recklessness as a matter of law, as determined by a
judge.140 Only then will the jury determine the alleged infringer’s
subjective intent and whether the party knew or should have known that
their actions constituted patent infringement.
Commentators correctly believe this new standard will make it more
difficult for a patentee to demonstrate that the infringer acted objectively

136. Seaman, supra note 129, at 448. When the Model Patent Jury Instructions were tested
against the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level test using the readability feature in Microsoft Word, the
program returned 15.8 which translates to 15.8 years of education, with 12.0 meaning a high school
graduate having eight years of grade school and four years of high school education can read and
comprehend the document. Id.
137. Gallagher, supra note 2, at 8.
138. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 394 (2000).
139. Seaman, supra note 129, at 445.
140. Gallagher, supra note 2, at 2.
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reckless.141 The judge evaluating the objective threshold prong of
Seagate empowers courts to more actively assess allegations of willful
patent infringement prior to trial.142 Since Seagate was decided, many
courts have granted summary judgment determining that the objective
prong of willful infringement was not met, and Bard will accelerate this
trend.143 While there are drawbacks to any approach, the ability to
dispose of willfulness prior to trial has its clear advantages.
Bard will likely result in more settlements since both sides have a
better understanding of the likely litigation outcome concerning
willfulness.144 The judge deciding the first prong removes uncertainty
and narrows the range of expected damages. For example, if a judge
determines that the alleged infringer was not objectively reckless under
Seagate, the two parties will have far greater certainty concerning a
potential range of damages, since enhanced damages are off the table
unless appealed.145 The patent holder would also likely know that this is
an unexceptional case resulting in a denial of attorneys’ fees under
§ 285. This certainty helps potential litigants determine whether they
should settle or proceed to trial.146 Both plaintiffs and defendants desire
greater certainty, especially when the damage award greatly influences
their balance sheet. As a result, litigants might decide that it makes
better business sense to settle rather than face an expensive trial if both
parties know the likely outcome. There would be little incentive to
incur further attorneys’ fees and the loss of productivity of corporate
managers from aiding the attorneys with the trial.
Disposing of litigations by settlement frees up judicial resources from
an overburdened court system. In some instances, litigants may possibly
abandon their infringement action if the damage award does not
economically justify the risk and cost of litigation. On the other hand, if
a judge determines that the alleged infringer was objectively reckless,
this would also narrow the range of expected damages potentially
bringing the sides together. Either way, the judge determining the
objective recklessness prong closes the gap of expected damages likely
resulting in more settlements due to greater certainty.147
141. See, e.g., Christopher Mays, Federal Circuit Overhauls Willful Patent Infringement Test,
LEXOLOGY (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2c2945d2-b8bd-4dcf-a706ab7ce4d0b446.
142. Shane Olafson, Standard Clarified for Willful Patent Infringement: Objective Prong Is a
Question
of
Law
for
the
Judge,
JDSUPRA
LAW
NEWS
(July
5,
2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/standard-clarified-for-willful-patent-in-07540.
143. Id.
144. Warren, Jr. & Quecan, supra note 118.
145. See Olafson, supra note 142.
146. Id.
147. See id.
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Critics believe this change from jury to judge might also complicate
trials, by possibly requiring a separate hearing to consider willfulness.148
If the objective recklessness analysis turns squarely on questions or fact,
such as the reasonableness of an anticipation or obviousness defense, the
judge could wait until after the jury renders their verdict under the
subjective prong of the Seagate analysis.149 Critics feel a Markman
style hearing150 may not present the best avenue if the defense is purely
fact based or contains both questions of law and fact.151 As a result,
courts may have to determine the question on a partial summary
judgment motion or later as a judgment as a matter of law.152
While trial complications are clearly undesired, Bard will not
complicate litigation. Instead, Bard will allow judges to streamline the
proceedings by determining what factual issues should be sent to the
jury.153 If the objective recklessness prong turns squarely on a question
of law, a court can use a Markman style hearing to resolve the issue.154
This hearing would clarify the factual issues for the jury, so the jury can
better focus on whether the alleged infringer knew or should have
known of the risk.155 This approach would create much needed
efficiencies in the court system and preserve scarce judicial resources,

148. Audrey A. Millemann, Willful Patent Infringement Now Harder to Prove, THE IP LAW BLOG
(Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.theiplawblog.com/archives/-patent-law-willful-patent-infringement-nowharder-to-prove.html.
149. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Federal Circuit Establishes New Rule for Proving
Willful Infringement: Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc, JDSUPRA LAW
NEWS (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/federal-circuit-establishes-new-rule-for29158.
150. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal Circuit stated
that
[d]uring so called Markman ‘hearings,’ which are often longer than jury trials, parties battle over
experts offering conflicting evidence regarding who qualifies as one of ordinary skill in the art;
the meaning of patent terms to that person; the state of the art at the time of the invention;
contradictory dictionary definitions and which would be consulted by the skilled artisan; the
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all while reducing the costs for litigants.156 Some critics may feel that
jurors should see the entire infringer’s case and make their decision
accordingly, without the judge simplifying and condensing the jury
questions. While this might seem great in theory, this would result in
unnecessary juror confusion possibly tainting the trial’s outcome in
reality.
E. Unifies Precedent by Utilizing De Novo Review
Bard’s utilization of de novo review unifies precedent. Since the
objective prong of the Seagate willfulness analysis is a question of law
decided by the judge, even if the issue presents mixed questions of law
and fact, the appeal is subject to de novo review.157 The Federal Circuit
will now review, without deference, all evidence supporting or rejecting
objective recklessness by the alleged infringer. De novo review unifies
precedent by allowing independent review necessary for appellate courts
to clarify and maintain control of legal principles.158
Bard provides litigants more certainty in anticipating outcomes.159
Additionally, upfront business driven litigation choices can be pursued
without the constant fear of a coin toss outcome. “Requiring the
application of law, rather than a decisionmaker’s caprice, does more
than simply provide citizens notice of what actions may subject them to
punishment; it also helps to assure the uniform general treatment of
similarly situated persons.”160 Critics believe that since the case is
reviewed without deference, an unlucky litigant at trial could obtain a
second chance with the Federal Circuit. However, the Federal Circuit,
keenly aware of this trick, will not allow it to upset the balance of
power. In cases where warranted, this will allow the Federal Circuit to
fix an erroneous decision.
Utilization of de novo review will affect the litigant’s trial strategy
and preparation. Because of the new de novo standard of review for
objective recklessness, the alleged infringer must be keenly vigilant to
preserve all defenses and claim construction arguments for appeal.161
After Bard, the alleged infringer must make sure all pre-verdict and
post-verdict motions seen in F.R.C.P. 50(a) and F.R.C.P. 50(b) are
preserved and not waived, including non-infringement and invalidity
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defenses.162
V. CONCLUSION
Bard v. W.L. Gore was correctly decided because the thoughtful shift
from jury to judge (1) reinforces the trend of related precedent, (2)
aligns willfulness within the enhanced damages framework, (3) enables
judges, who are better suited, to determine objective recklessness as a
matter of law, (4) aids in trial management by reducing expensive
litigation resources, and (5) unifies precedent by utilizing de novo
review.
Bard’s change in making the court the gatekeeper for willful patent
infringement allegations as well as Bard’s effect on de novo reviews
will greatly impact both litigants’ strategies. Moreover, Bard will help
patent holders, such as Apple and Samsung, more efficiently manage
their massive patent portfolios.
Since the judge now determines the objective recklessness prong as a
matter of law, patent holders have a better understanding prior to trial of
whether enhanced damages are obtainable.163 With a smaller range of
potential damages, regardless of whether objective recklessness is
satisfied or not, business executives can make more informed decisions,
including settlement and dismissal of the lawsuit.164 As a result, some
non-practicing entities that extract payments from apparent infringers
may have to reevaluate their business model.165
While Bard’s new standard will make it more difficult for a patentee
to demonstrate that the infringer acted objectively reckless, this will not
likely affect the percentage of patent holders that include accusations of
willful patent infringement in their lawsuit, since as Bard showed, this
could equate to hundreds of millions of dollars, resulting in fortune or
bankruptcy for both the patent holder and investors.
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